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Basic Emotion theory has had a tremendous influence on the affective sciences,
including music psychology, where most researchers have assumed that music
expressivity is constrained to a limited set of basic emotions. Several scholars suggested
that these constrains to musical expressivity are explained by the existence of a shared
acoustic code to the expression of emotions in music and speech prosody. In this article
we advocate for a shift from this focus on basic emotions to a constructionist account.
This approach proposes that the phenomenon of perception of emotions in music
arises from the interaction of music’s ability to express core affects and the influence
of top-down and contextual information in the listener’s mind. We start by reviewing
the problems with the concept of Basic Emotions, and the inconsistent evidence that
supports it. We also demonstrate how decades of developmental and cross-cultural
research on music and emotional speech have failed to produce convincing findings to
conclude that music expressivity is built upon a set of biologically pre-determined basic
emotions. We then examine the cue-emotion consistencies between music and speech,
and show how they support a parsimonious explanation, where musical expressivity is
grounded on two dimensions of core affect (arousal and valence). Next, we explain
how the fact that listeners reliably identify basic emotions in music does not arise from
the existence of categorical boundaries in the stimuli, but from processes that facilitate
categorical perception, such as using stereotyped stimuli and close-ended response
formats, psychological processes of construction of mental prototypes, and contextual
information. Finally, we outline our proposal of a constructionist account of perception
of emotions in music, and spell out the ways in which this approach is able to make
solve past conflicting findings. We conclude by providing explicit pointers about the
methodological choices that will be vital to move beyond the popular Basic Emotion
paradigm and start untangling the emergence of emotional experiences with music in
the actual contexts in which they occur.
Keywords: music, basic emotions, dimensions, constructionism, perception of musical emotions, emotional
expression in speech
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INTRODUCTION
One of music’s most pervasive features is its power to represent
or express meanings. All over the world people use music to
symbolize a wide variety of meanings that range from national
identities, and religious and political ideologies, to intimate
personal connotations (Schubert, 2009; Clayton, 2016). Among
this variety of meanings, the ability of music to represent or
express emotions stands out as one of the main reasons why
music is omnipresent in commercial environments, television,
cinema, and the internet (North and Hargreaves, 2008), and is
one of the main motivations why people devote so much time,
energy and money to it (Kawase and Obata, 2016; Lamont et al.,
2016). In developed societies, music has become one of the most
important strategies for creating, enhancing, and modulating
emotions (Thayer et al., 1994; Juslin and Laukka, 2004; Batt-
Rawden and DeNora, 2005; Saarikallio, 2011; van Goethem and
Sloboda, 2011).
During the last two decades, the emotional power of music
has received increasing interest from psychology researchers, who
have focused on two phenomena: the ability of music to arouse
emotions, and its ability to express them. While this second
line of research has amassed an impressive amount of evidence
about how particular musical structures are related with listeners’
perception of emotion (Gabrielsson, 2009; Juslin and Timmers,
2010), it has not captured the richness and variety of emotional
and non-emotional meanings that music represents in everyday
contexts. On the contrary, influenced by the Basic Emotions
theoretical framework (Tomkins, 1962; Izard, 1977; Ekman,
1992; Panksepp, 2000), most researchers in music psychology
have restricted their investigation to music’s ability to express
a limited set of so-called “basic emotions,” usually Happiness,
Sadness, Fear, and Anger, and sometimes tenderness or love too
(Krumhansl, 1997; Kallinen, 2005; Mohn et al., 2010; Juslin, 2013;
Koelsch, 2014; see Eerola and Vuoskoski, 2013 for a review).
Other researchers, influenced by Russell’s (1980) circumplex
model, have investigated the phenomenon of musical expressivity
in terms of more basic dimensions of affect (usually arousal
and valence, e.g., Schubert, 1999; Gomez and Danuser, 2007;
Egermann et al., 2009), while others have used other dimensions
(such as tension and energy, e.g., Illie and Thompson, 2006, 2011)
or ad hoc lists of emotional adjectives (e.g., Wedin, 1972; Giomo,
1993; Leman et al., 2005).
Most research about musical expressivity has been carried
without discussing why music expressivity should be organized
around discrete, basic emotions, or around more fundamental
affective dimensions (Eerola and Vuoskoski, 2013). Two
important exceptions are a study by Eerola and Vuoskoski
(2011) that compared perceived emotions in music using the
discrete emotion model, and the dimensional model of affect,
and concluded that although there is a high correspondence
between both models, the dimensional model is better suited to
rate musical experts with ambiguous emotional expressivity. The
second exception is Flaig and Large’s (2014) theory of dynamic
communication of core affect, according to which, musically
induced neural resonance communicates affect by modulating
the listener’s arousal (via variations in tempo and intensity), and
valence (via violation of musical expectations). In this paper,
we focus on reviewing the evidence for the view that music
expresses basic emotions, and like Flaig and Large (2014), we
propose that adopting a dimensional model is a more fruitful
framework to musical expressivity. However, unlike their theory,
our theory does not deal with the underlying neural mechanisms
that produce the modulations in listener’s arousal and valence.
Among those researchers who have studied musical
expressivity in terms of discrete emotions, Juslin and colleagues
have been the strongest advocates for the view that perception
of emotions in music is based on the resemblance between
vocal and musical expression of a set of basic emotions (Juslin,
1997, 2013; Juslin and Laukka, 2001, 2003; Lindström et al.,
2003; Juslin and Timmers, 2010). Drawing from theories such
as Ekman’s (1992) and Panksepp’s (2000), Juslin and colleagues
theorize that there is a shared acoustic code to the expression
of emotions in music and speech prosody, and that this code is
organized into discrete categories, called “basic emotions.” In this
perspective, basic emotions are considered innate and universal
affect programs, which evolved through phylogenesis to serve
important survival functions. Several empirical predictions are
derived from this view of emotional expressivity: facial and
vocal expressions of basic emotions (and therefore musical
expressions of basic emotions too) are more readily perceived
than expressions of non-basic emotions; basic emotions are
expressed and perceived equally across cultures; appear early in
development (Izard and Malatesta, 1987); have distinct brain
substrates (Panksepp, 2000); are associated with distinct patterns
of physiological activation (Ekman et al., 1983); and form the
basis for other, non-basic emotions (Plutchik, 1980; Izard, 1992).
Additionally, vocal and facial emotional expressions can also be
identified in other species (Geen, 1992).
This Basic Emotions approach to musical expressivity
underlies Juslin’s models of musical meaning: their theory of
musical expressivity, and their model of musical communication.
Juslin’s theory of musical expressivity proposes that perception
of musical emotions is based on three “layers” of coding
of musical expression, which communicate basic emotions,
tension, and arbitrary associations, respectively (Juslin, 2013).
His second approach to musical meaning consists of a “lens
model” of musical communication (Juslin, 1997, 2003; Juslin
and Lindström, 2010). According to this model, senders (i.e.,
music performers or people talking emotionally) use a number of
probabilistic and partly redundant acoustic cues to encode their
emotional message. These cues leave traces in the acoustic object
which can be subsequently detected by receivers (i.e., music
listeners or conversation partners), who use them to decode and
identify the intended emotion. Each cue in isolation is not a
perfect indicator of the expressed emotion, and therefore the
more cues are present in the acoustic object, and the more
cues are used by decoders, the more likely it is that accurate
communication takes place. Additionally, because some of the
cues are partly redundant (i.e., they are associated with the same
expressive intention), there are several cue combinations that can
lead to successful communication.
The aim of this paper is to challenge the view that musical
expressivity is organized around a set of discrete, basic emotions,
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and to propose an alternative, constructionist account of how
the phenomenon of perceiving (or rather attributing) emotions
expressed by music arises from our ability to detect the variations
of arousal and valence specified by the musical sounds, and
processes of categorization that relate those variations with
contextual, situational, and personal cues. This interaction
between perception of affect and categorization produces the
experience of perceiving that a piece of music expresses emotions
as if they were somehow “within” the musical sounds. In the first
section of the paper we criticize the concept of basic emotions.
Subsequently, we review the problematic evidence that supports
the existence of shared acoustic code to the expression of basic
emotions in vocalizations and music. Finally, we propose a
constructionist account of the perception of musical emotions
that overcomes the problems derived from applying the concept
of Basic Emotions for musical expressions of emotion, and we
discuss its implications for future research.
THE PROBLEMS WITH THE CONCEPT
OF BASIC EMOTIONS
The scholars who defend the concept of Basic Emotions conceive
them as biologically primitive (i.e., supported by hardwired,
discrete biological subsystems) and/or as psychologically
primitive (i.e., as having elementary eliciting conditions,
and forming the basis for other emotions) (Ortony and
Turner, 1990; Scarantino and Griffiths, 2011). The biological
primitiveness assumption is contradicted by findings that
the same biological subsystems serve emotional and non-
emotional psychological processes, and that even structures
traditionally associated with discrete emotions (e.g., amygdala
and fear), are involved in several emotions such as anger,
happiness, and sadness (Lindquist et al., 2012; Raz et al.,
2016). The psychological primitiveness assumption, in turn,
is challenged by the consideration that several emotions
traditionally considered as “basic,” share more elementary
components. For instance, Anger, Sadness, and Disgust share
a component of displeasure; and both Anger and Fear involve
an evaluation of a situation as obstructing the realization
of the individual’s goals (Ortony and Turner, 1990; Scherer,
2009).
A second set of problems with the Basic Emotion construct
is that those who defend it do not agree on which emotions
should be considered “basic.” Every author who proposes the
existence of basic emotions has submitted a different list,
ranging from two categories (Weiner and Graham, 1984) to ten
(Izard, 1977). For instance, whereas Panksepp (2007) identifies
seven “basic emotional responses” (Seeking, Rage, Fear, Lust,
Care, Panic, and Play), Ekman and Cordaro (2011) propose
somewhat different seven categories (Anger, Fear, Surprise,
Sadness, Disgust, Contempt, and Happiness). Moreover, “love”
or “tenderness,” an emotion included by Juslin (2013) in the list
of basic emotions that vocalizations and music are able to express
only appears in 4 out of the 14 theories reviewed by Ortony and
Turner (1990). This figure increases to five theories if we consider
Panksepp’s (2007) “care” category as equivalent.
In a paper dedicated to presenting his theory of how music
expresses basic emotions, Juslin (2013, p. 6) argues that these
disagreements do not constitute a problem, because the concept
of basic emotions has heuristic value for the researchers who have
adopted it, and because there is greater agreement about which
emotions should be considered basic, than about how emotions
should be defined in general. In our view, these arguments do
not solve the problem. First, the fact that affective science has
a problem agreeing on a definition of emotion is very serious,
but probably not as insurmountable as Juslin makes it appear
to be, as demonstrated by the similarities between several recent
consensual definitions such as Scherer’s (2005), Frijda’s (2008),
and Juslin and Sloboda (2010). Second, the existence of that lack
of consensus does not make the lack of agreement among Basic
Emotion theorists less serious. Third, even though it is true that
several research programs have used the basic emotions concept
in a heuristic manner, the fact that their lists and definitions
do not match completely has made it difficult to accumulate
the evidence into a single coherent conceptual framework. For
instance, since anxiety, stress, distress, fear, and terror are similar
but not identical states and concepts, the conclusions of research
into these affective states are not necessarily consistent (c.f.
Kreibig, 2010, p. 410). Finally, this narrow focus on a limited set
of emotions has made this line of research lose sight of the great
variety of emotional experiences that people have during their
life-span and across different cultures, and of the relationship
between these discrete, full-blown emotions and other affective
states such as moods, preferences, and attitudes.
THE PROBLEMATIC EVIDENCE FOR THE
EXISTENCE OF BASIC EMOTIONS
The Basic Emotion approach has also faced criticisms due to
the lack of consistent empirical evidence for their claim that
basic emotions are biologically hardwired affect programs. After
decades of research, there is still no solid evidence for the
existence of distinctive patterns associated with discrete emotions
at the neural, physiological, and behavioral levels.
Regarding the evidence for dedicated brain systems associated
with discrete emotions, the main conclusion drawn from recent
reviews is that instead of discrete subsystems associated with
each basic emotion, there are specific brain areas associated
with specific behaviors (e.g., freezing, attacking, and smiling),
which are sometimes present when emotions are elicited (Barrett,
2006a; Lindquist et al., 2012). Similarly, reviews of the evidence
for distinct patterns of peripheral physiological activation have
failed to find robust and consistent patterns distinguishing
discrete emotion categories (Cacioppo et al., 2000; Kreibig, 2010;
Stephens et al., 2010; Kragel and LaBar, 2013)1.
Regarding facial and vocal expressions of emotions, there is
little and conflicting evidence for the claim that the patterns
predicted by Basic Emotion theories such as Ekman and
1Two of these studies claim to have found distinctive patterns of autonomic
activation associated with basic emotions. However, although these studies used
similar pattern classification methods and stimuli, they did not replicate each other
in the patterns they report (Stephens et al., 2010; Kragel and LaBar, 2013)
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Friesen (1984) are present in spontaneous emotional expressions
(Gosselin et al., 1995; Carroll and Russell, 1997; Camras et al.,
2002; Scherer and Ellgring, 2007). Vocal expressions of emotions
have been much less researched than facial expressions, and most
of this research has been carried out using portrayed expressions
as stimuli, so there is little data about the extent to which these
posed expressions correspond to natural ones (Scherer, 2003).
The strongest piece of empirical support for the existence of
Basic Emotions supported by biological affect programs is the
finding that participants attribute the same emotional states to
photographs of portrayed facial expressions above chance level
(70% on average, according to Scherer et al., 2011). Nevertheless,
this agreement level lessens when participants are asked to
rate natural or milder expressions, when participants observe
dynamic rather than static expressions, when researchers use
open-ended questionnaires rather than lists of a few emotional
adjectives, when participants rate expressions made by people
from a culture different to their own; and importantly, when the
stimuli consist of vocal expressions (Frank and Stennett, 2001;
Elfenbein and Ambady, 2003; Kayyal and Russell, 2013; Nelson
and Russell, 2013).
Evidence for the Expression of Basic
Emotions in Vocalizations
The most important argument for the claim that music
expresses basic emotions is the existence of acoustic patterns
in human vocalizations associated with the expression of
discrete, basic emotions (Juslin and Laukka, 2003; Fritz et al.,
2009; Koelsch, 2014). This claim is not clearly supported by
empirical evidence so far. The most consistent finding of studies
analyzing the acoustic qualities of emotional prosody is that these
psychoacoustic cues correlate most clearly with differences in
arousal. More specific acoustic patterns distinguishing variations
in valence, or distinguishing discrete emotional states have
been more difficult to identify (Bachorowski, 1999; Russell
et al., 2003; Juslin and Scherer, 2005; Scherer et al., 2011).
Scherer (2003), Juslin and Scherer (2005), and Scherer et al.
(2011) have argued that this situation is due to the fact
that most research has studied a limited number of acoustic
cues, and has neglected arousal differences present within
“emotion families” (e.g., the differences between “repressed”
anger and “explosive” anger). In their joint paper, Juslin and
Scherer (2005) go as far as proposing that affective states of
a relatively weak intensity are probably only differentiated in
terms of the arousal and valence dimensions (Laukka et al.,
2005). This observation suggests that clear-cut psychoacoustic
patterns could only be identified when emotional expressions
are intense. In consequence, only when the vocal stimuli used
in experimental research are posed and exaggerated (like the
expressions traditionally used in facial emotional expression
research), do researchers find psychoacoustic patterns associated
with discrete emotions.
Juslin and Laukka (2003) carried out a review of 104 studies
on vocal expression of emotion, and 41 studies on musical
expression, and concluded that there are enough acoustic
differences in emotional prosody to distinguish five basic
emotions in vocalizations and music: Anger, Fear, Happiness,
Sadness, and Love-Tenderness. However, an examination of this
evidence for these patterns in emotional vocalizations shows
that there are at least three reasons to be skeptical about this
conclusion. Furthermore, we analyze their evidence for musical
expressions of emotion in the next section.
First, the majority of the studies included in Juslin and
Laukka’s (2003) review (87%) used portrayals by actors. This
type of studies tells us how actors think emotions should be
portrayed, rather than how they actually happen, -in other
words, these conclusions lack ecological validity. Hence, their
usefulness consists in informing us about people’s prototype or
ideal expressions for hypothetical, full-blown emotional states
(Motley and Camden, 1988; Fernández-Dols et al., 1997; Russell
et al., 2003; Nelson and Russell, 2013). For instance, in an
experiment by Banse and Scherer (1996), where they claim to
have found acoustic patterns associated with discrete emotions,
the authors used vocalizations portrayed by actors. Moreover, the
patterns associated with discrete emotions were not identified
in all the 1344 vocal samples obtained from the actors, but on
a subset of 224 samples which were further analyzed because
they were judged as “best acted.” And in a more recent study
by Bänziger et al. (2014) where they also compared vocalizations
portrayed by actors in French and German confirmed the finding
that most psychoacoustic cues are associated with variations in
arousal, and that there are small, or non-existent associations
with variations in valence.
Second, most of the findings about associations between
acoustic cues and discrete emotions indicate that most of these
cues are the same for emotions that have the same level of
activation (Juslin and Laukka, 2003, pp. 792–795). Sadness and
Tenderness, the two emotions with low activation, correlate
with slow speech rate, low intensity, low frequency energy, low
mean fundamental frequency (F0), and downward contours.
Whereas Anger, Fear, and Happiness, the emotions with high
activation level, correlate with fast speech rate, high intensity,
high voice intensity variability, high frequency energy, high mean
fundamental frequency, low fundamental frequency variability,
and upward contours.
Third, only two of the nine acoustic parameters summarized
in Juslin and Laukka’s review distinguish emotions beyond their
level of activation. But even there, the results do not point to
robust and consistent differences. Juslin and Laukka conclude
that F0 variability distinguishes Anger (high variability) from
Fear (low variability). Nevertheless, there are almost as many
studies that found that Fear is associated with high or medium
F0 variability (n = 15) than the number of studies that found
that it is associated with low variability (n = 17). In fact, if we
exclude from this list a study that found that Fear is associated
with both medium and low variability, and a study that found
that this emotion is associated with both high and low variability,
then the number of studies reporting low and high or medium
variability is the same (n = 15), and the distinction between Anger
and Fear in terms of F0 variability becomes less clear. The second
acoustic cue that distinguishes emotional expressions beyond
arousal in the review is the level of microstructural regularity
of the voices (i.e., small variations in frequency and intensity).
However, this finding is based only on 5 studies (out of 104),
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and they can be interpreted as distinguishing between positive
and negative valenced emotions: Happiness and Tenderness are
associated with microstructural regularity, whereas Anger, Fear,
and Sadness are associated with microstructural irregularity.
In summary, in this section we have shown how, despite
the predictions of Basic Emotion theories, there is little and
inconsistent evidence for the existence of distinctive patterns
associated with discrete emotions at the physiological, neural,
and expressive behavior levels (i.e., facial expressions and speech
prosody).
Before analyzing the evidence that music expresses basic
emotions, it is important to clarify the scope of the criticism
we have presented so far to the notion that emotions have
associated facial and vocal expressions. Our claim is not that
emotional episodes have absolutely no effects on facial and vocal
behavior. It is very unlikely that emotions have no consequences
on our facial behavior and on our speech prosody. Moreover,
these effects should be more obvious in very intense emotional
episodes, when the eliciting situation is so relevant and urgent
that we feel overtaken by urges to attack, to hide away, to embrace
someone, to be comforted, etc. Since all these action tendencies
are associated with physiological changes in the autonomic
nervous system (Frijda, 1986), they are probably also reflected in
our faces and in the acoustic features of our voices (see Scherer,
1986, for specific hypotheses about the effects of appraisals on the
physiology of vocalizations). In contrast, less intense emotional
episodes and more diffuse affective states such as moods probably
have less prominent physiological effects, and therefore, less clear
effects on vocal and facial expressions.
Nevertheless, acknowledging that intense emotions involve
changes in facial and vocal behaviors should not be taken
as implying that every type of emotion is associated with a
distinctive pattern of physiological and expressive behaviors.
On the contrary, since every instance of anger, fear, joy, etc.,
is different, then there is no guarantee that the same action
tendencies, physiological changes, and behaviors are present
every time we experience these emotions. Consider the following
examples: the experience of running into a bear in the woods,
sitting in a doctor’s waiting room expecting a diagnosis of cancer,
having to answer a difficult question in the context of a job
interview, and listening to an eerie sound at midnight in a house
where we assumed we were alone. Even though all of these
experiences can be considered instances of “fear,” the different
contexts in which they occur require us to respond in different
ways, and therefore the pattern of physiological activation and the
observable behavioral expressions would also be different in every
case. Furthermore, since emotional responses are always tailored
to the demands of the situation, the full pattern of expressive
behaviors predicted by Basic Emotion theories are very seldom,
if ever, observable in natural circumstances (Barrett, 2006a).
DOES MUSIC EXPRESS BASIC
EMOTIONS?
In this section we examine the claim that music expresses basic
emotions. After all, even though the perception of emotion
in music may not have its origin in discrete, biologically
hardwired emotions, it is still possible that people perceive
musically expressed emotions in categories that correspond to
basic emotions.
As mentioned above, traditionally, researchers of musical
expression of emotions have asked listeners to judge a set of
discrete, basic emotions: Anger, Fear, Happiness, Sadness, and
Love or tenderness (Eerola and Vuoskoski, 2013). Consequently,
they have concluded that these emotions are expressed by music,
and reliably recognized by listeners.
In our view, there are three problems with using these sources
of evidence as the basis for determining which emotions music
can express. First, asking listeners which emotions they think
music expresses, inform us about people’s ideas about what
emotions music expresses, not about their actual experiences
of perceiving those emotions in music. Second, the evidence
from experiments on perception of musical emotions involves
a circular logic: most researchers assume a priori that music
expresses a list of emotions, ask their participants to report their
experience using the categories in that list, and conclude that in
effect, music expresses the emotions they hypothesized. Third,
and most importantly, the arguments for selecting which basic
emotions music expresses should not only be empirical, but
also, theoretical. To our knowledge, the advocates of the view
that music expresses five basic emotions have not proposed a
systematic conceptual account of why music should be able to
express the set of basic emotions they propose. As a consequence,
they have left two crucial questions unanswered.
The first question, is why these researchers have decided to
include a category that appears in only a few Basic Emotion
theories: Love-Tenderness. If the answer is simply that this
category appears frequently in the lists of emotions that people
more easily perceived in music, then why not include other
common categories, such as “peacefulness”? Research into
everyday experiences with music has found that two of the
most frequently perceived affective states in music are calm or
peacefulness (Lindström et al., 2003; Juslin and Laukka, 2004).
Why then, not assume that ‘calm’ is a basic emotion?
The second question, is why out of all the emotions proposed
within the Basic Emotions approach, advocates of the Basic
Emotions view such as Juslin and colleagues have included
only five categories (Happiness, Anger, Fear, Sadness, and
Tenderness), in neglect of others categories such as Disgust,
Contempt, Guilt, Shame, and Lust (c.f. Ortony and Turner,
1990 for different versions of Basic Emotions lists). Perhaps
the answer is that the emotions most frequently included in
music research are affective states that can be experienced
without the need for an intentional object, whereas Disgust,
Guilt, Shame, and Lust are always intentional states; that is,
they are experienced directed to an object (e.g., every time
we feel guilty, we feel guilty about something in particular).
And since instrumental music is characterized by its inability
to specify the object of the emotions it represents, then music’s
ability to represent affective experiences is restricted to the
expression of object-less affective states (Kivy, 1999; Davies,
2003; Cross, 2009). Although this might be a sensible argument,
the Basic Emotion approach to musical expressivity could
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not adopt it, because it implies that music cannot express
emotions but moods, which are the type of affective states that
can be experienced without a clear intentional object. Hence,
assuming this argument would ultimately contradict the central
assumption of the Basic Emotions framework, that focuses on
the phylogenetically inherited character of emotions (i.e., quick,
object-directed, motivationally driving reactions), not of moods
(i.e., slow, diffuse, cognitive-biasing states are experienced as
directed toward the world in general, rather than toward a
determinate object) (Frijda, 2008).
Evidence From Developmental Studies
According to the Basic Emotions framework, expression and
perception of basic emotions appear early in development
(Harris, 1989; Izard, 1992; Juslin, 2013). If music expressivity
is organized around basic emotions whose expression and
perception appears early in ontogeny, then it follows that
children’s perception of musical emotions should follow the same
early developmental path.
The evidence from emotion development studies of in
non-musical domains contradicts this assumption. Thus, until
approximately age 3, children’s emotional vocabulary and
perception is organized into broad categories representing the
contrast between positive and negative experiences (Widen and
Russell, 2008; Székely, 2013; Widen, 2013). Infants progressively
incorporate more fine-grained categories such as sadness, anger,
and fear when they reach the age of 4 or 5 (Bormann-Kischkel
et al., 1990; Widen and Russell, 2008; Widen, 2013).
This process of development is not clearly paralleled in music.
While some studies have found evidence for discrimination of
valence expressed by music in children as young as 3 years, most
studies have found that the ability to discriminate happy from
sad musical excerpts above chance starts to emerge at some point
around 4 or 5 years of age (Dolgin and Adelson, 1990; Adachi
and Trehub, 1998; Mote, 2011; Stachó et al., 2013; Franco et al.,
2016; but see Cunningham and Sterling, 1988; and Hunter et al.,
2011, for two studies that found this ability only in later ages).
Notably, the ability emerges around the same age when they
develop the ability to entrain to musical rhythms, suggesting that
tempo variations play a central role in the ability to distinguish
these two expressions both in speech and music (Dalla Bella et al.,
2001).
Several studies have found that young children tend to confuse
angry and fear expressions (Terwogt and van Grinsven, 1991;
Nawrot, 2003; Esposito and Serio, 2007). In fact, children’s ability
to discriminate happy, sad, angry, and fearful expressions in
music starts to appear around 6 to 8 years of age (Kastner Pinchot
and Crowder, 1990; Kratus, 1993; Gerardi and Gerken, 1995;
Dalla Bella et al., 2001; Nawrot, 2003), and their ability only
reaches adult-like performance in emotion discrimination tasks
of music much later: around age 11 (Hunter et al., 2011). The
disagreements on the exact age where these abilities emerge may
be attributed to differences in stimuli, procedure, and response
formats used in each study (see Franco et al., 2016 for a review of
these methods). However, beyond this variety, a developmental
milestone that happens between 6 and 8 years of age explains
the gradual development of discriminating several emotions
expressed by music: the acquisition of sensitivity to mode, a
musical cue associated with the expression of negative emotions
in Western music (Gregory et al., 1996). Studies such as Adachi
and Trehub (1998) and Dalla Bella et al. (2001) suggest that while
younger children only rely on tempo variations to discriminate
the emotional message expressed by music (a cue that is also
present in vocalizations, and is therefore probably universal),
older children and adults rely also on mode variations (and to
some extent melodic contour, Gerardi and Gerken, 1995). Taken
together, these findings suggest that early recognition of emotions
in music relies on perceptual mechanisms that detect variations
in arousal in vocalizations, such as tempo and loudness, but
discrimination of discrete emotions depends on learning culture-
specific cues such as mode. In sum, contrary to the predictions
of Basic Emotion theory, perception of the whole set of basic
emotions in music does not occur early in development, and it
seems to depend on learning culture-specific cues such as specific
associations between mode and mood.
Evidence From Cross-Cultural Studies
If expression of emotions in music arouses from hardwired
biological programs associated with the expression of basic
emotions, then it follows that the striking findings about universal
perception of facial expressions (Matsumoto et al., 2008; but see
Nelson and Russell, 2013) should be paralleled in music too.
In fact, music psychologists have embraced the central thesis
of Elfenbein’s dialect theory of facial expressions of emotion
(Elfenbein et al., 2007), and Thompson and Balkwill’s Cue-
Redundancy Model of listeners’ perception of emotion in music
(Balkwill and Thompson, 1999; Thompson and Balkwill, 2010).
According to these two models, cross-cultural expression and
communication of emotion (in facial expressions and music,
respectively) is made possible by the existence of both universal
and culture-specific cues. In consequence, the more universal
cues are present in a piece of music, the more listeners unfamiliar
with a piece of music from another culture can infer the same
emotions expressed in that piece as enculturated listeners.
The evidence from cross-cultural studies on perception of
musical emotions supports the general hypothesis that listeners
are able to identify the intended emotional expression of
music from a different culture (Thompson and Balkwill, 2010).
What is less clear from this evidence, however, is that cross-
cultural perception of musical emotions is organized around
basic emotion categories. Several pioneering studies into this
phenomenon had many methodological limitations, such as
the use of ad hoc categories rather than standard emotional
adjectives as dependent measures and participants have also
been familiar with western music, making the comparability of
results difficult (Gundlach, 1932, 1935; Morey, 1940; Deva and
Virmani, 1975; Gregory and Varney, 1996). And while more
recent have used standard emotional adjectives, they have usually
explored the perception of only three categories: Joy, Sadness,
and Anger (e.g., Balkwill et al., 2004; Fritz et al., 2009), and in
consequence their results are open to an alternative, dimensional
explanation. Namely, the fact that these emotions correspond to
different combinations of activation and valence levels (Russell
and Barrett, 1999), makes it possible that the participants’
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accurate responses were due to their ability to distinguish the
difference between an energetic and positive emotion and a
subdued and negative one, rather than between Joy and Sadness,
for example. In other words, the results from these studies make
it impossible to discard the hypothesis that the participants’
perception is organized around general affective dimensions
rather than around discrete categories. Thus, participants in these
experiments tended to choose the “correct” emotional adjective,
because they detected the levels of arousal and valence specified
by the music, and they used contextual cues to figure out the
discrete emotional category that better fitted with those arousal
and valence levels. In the context of these experiments, these
contextual cues might have been provided by the use of close-
ended response formats, which bias the listener’s perceptual
experience. (We return to this point in section “The Role of
Contexts in the Perception of Emotional Expressions”).
A recent experiment by Laukka et al. (2013) sought to
overcome these and other limitations of past research, such as
the tendency to use Western music as the stimuli that listeners
have to judge. In this experiment, in addition to using Western
classical music excerpts, the researchers asked Swedish, Indian,
and Japanese musicians to create music to express 11 different
emotions and affective states (anger, fear, happiness, affection,
humor, longing, peacefulness, sadness, solemnity, spirituality,
and neutral), which were later judged by listeners from the same
three cultures. The researchers also analyzed the extent to which
musicians and listeners use the same acoustic cues to encode
and decode the intended affective expressions. The results from
the experiment largely support the researchers’ predictions. The
listeners were better at identifying basic emotions (anger, fear,
happiness, and sadness) than non-basic ones (e.g., solemnity,
humor, and longing). And even though they were equally good
at recognizing the emotional expression intended by Western
classical music excerpts, they were better able to identify the
intended emotions in music from their own culture than from an
unfamiliar one. Although the results are encouraging in several
ways, the conclusions need to be qualified by the following
considerations.
First, the pattern of confusion exhibited by participants,
(i.e., the distribution of occasions when they misattributed the
intended expression in the music) was consistent with the
view that participants were sensitive to the activity and valence
dimensions of music.
Second, the acoustic cues associated with the expression
and perception of discrete emotions that have the same level
of activity and valence show a large number of coincidences.
These coincidences, however, are more marked across those cues
that are common to vocalizations and music (such as intensity,
timbre, and pitch height), than across those cues that can only be
found in music (such as modality, tonal, and rhythmic stability).
This suggests that even though the listeners’ sensibility to the first
type of cues may have helped them identify the level of arousal
and valence expressed by the music, the musically specific cues
were critical for the listeners’ ability to differentiate emotions with
similar levels on those dimensions.
Third, some emotions considered “basic” and therefore
universal, were not correctly identified above chance levels,
sometimes even by members of the same culture. For example,
Happiness was only correctly identified in Western classical
music and Swedish folk music; Sadness in Japanese music was not
recognized by most Japanese listeners, and Sadness in Swedish
music was not recognized by most Indian listeners. Affection, the
emotion category most closely related to the “tenderness/love”
category proposed as a basic emotion by Juslin and colleagues,
was not correctly identified in any of the non-Western musical
styles (the only exception was Indian music, were it was identified
only by Indian listeners). This finding that several basic emotions
were not identified even within listeners of the same culture
contrasts starkly with the high accuracy levels exhibited by
participants of experiments on cross-cultural perception of facial
and vocal expressions (c.f. Scherer et al., 2011).
In conclusion, the evidence from cross-cultural studies of
expression and perception of musical emotions supports the
hypothesis that expression of emotions in music is grounded
on acoustic cues shared with vocalizations, and that these cues
can at least signal variations in levels of arousal and valence.
The evidence for universal musical expressions associated with
discrete emotions is only partial, and it suggests that this fine-
grained differentiation might depend more on cues that are
present in music, but not in vocalizations. Clearly, further studies
using methods such as the one implemented by Laukka et al.
(2013) are needed to advance in understanding this phenomenon.
Evidence for Shared Psychoacoustic
Cues in Speech Prosody and Western
Music
The strongest piece of evidence for the expression of basic
emotions in music is the already mentioned review of 145
studies into emotional expression vocalizations and music carried
out by Juslin and Laukka (2003). This evidence, however, is
not completely unambiguous. Although the results of most
studies support the prediction that acoustic parameters associated
with the expression of emotion in vocalizations show the same
patterns of association in music, the evidence for the claim that
the acoustic parameters that discriminate specific emotions in
music are the same for vocalizations is less clear.
The meta-analysis paper by Juslin and Laukka (2003)
shows that most of the acoustic parameters associated with
specific emotions in music do not present the same pattern in
vocalizations. First, in music, Fear and Anger are distinguished by
sound level (high in Anger, low in Fear), but this distinction is not
paralleled in vocalizations, where both emotions are associated
with high sound level. Second, in music, Happiness is associated
with little sound level variability, whereas in vocalizations, it is
associated with high variability. And third, in music, timbres
characterized by abundant presence of high-frequencies are
associated with Anger, timbres with moderate number of high-
frequencies are associated with Happiness, and timbres with
few high-frequencies with Fear. In vocalizations, all emotions
with high levels of activation (Anger, Fear, and Happiness) are
associated with abundant presence of high frequencies.
The evidence from Juslin and Laukka’s (2003) review can
be complemented by more recently published experiments into
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shared psychoacoustic cues to the expression of emotions in
music and speech (Illie and Thompson, 2006; Curtis and
Bharucha, 2010; Scherer et al., 2011, 2013; Bowling et al.,
2012; Weninger et al., 2013); and by experiments on musical
parameters associated with expression of emotion (Costa et al.,
2004; Schubert, 2004; Juslin and Lindström, 2010; Eerola et al.,
2013; Quinto et al., 2014). As can be seen in Table 1, in general
terms this more recent evidence coincides with the results of
Juslin and Laukka’s (2003) review.
To further explore the parsimony of these cue-emotion
combinations using either basic emotions or emotion
dimensions, we subjected reported cue-affect combinations
from the existing studies to correspondence analysis (CA),
which attempts to represent them with an optimal number of
eigenvectors. We took all studies reporting acoustic or musical
cues contributing to emotions or quadrants in the affective
circumplex in music (53 studies) and speech (82 studies)
published after Juslin and Laukka’s (2003) review. We focused
on 15 cues (intensity, tempo, frequency, timbre, jitter, mode,
articulation, rhythmic complexity, harmonic complexity, attacks,
intensity, variability, jitter, contour, microstructural regularity)
and 5 basic emotions (anger, fear, happiness, love-tenderness,
and sadness) and 4 quadrants of affect dimensions (high arousal
positive valence, high arousal negative valence, low arousal
positive valence and low arousal and negative valence). Since the
basic emotion terminology varies across the studies, we reduced
the variant terms into 5 basic emotions using Juslin and Laukka’s
(2003) classification of emotion terms. This amounted to 1243
cue-emotion pairs in speech and music. The CA determined
the optimal decomposition of cues to affect categories in basic
emotions and dimensions in the two domains (music and
speech). Table 2 displays the decomposition summary and the
variance explained.
For Basic Emotions, the analysis offers consistently higher
number of necessary eigenvectors (4 vs. 3 dimensions) than
for the quadrants representing the affect dimensions when
representing the full contingency table of cues and emotion
terms. This suggests that the quadrants of the dimensional
representation capture the configuration in a more parsimonious
fashion than the Basic Emotions. Similarly, the first two
dimensions capture more variance in dimensional mapping
scheme in comparison with the Basic Emotions (75.8 and
93.6% for dimensions and 60.8 and 88.2% for Basic Emotions
in music and speech, respectively). Also, the chi-square
distances are consistently smaller for the decomposition of
dimensions to cues in comparison to Basic Emotions (with
non-overlapping bootstrapped confidence intervals). Also, the
cue-emotion combinations are somewhat simpler and more
redundant in speech in comparison to music, which is
similar to past results in emotion recognition in speech
and music (Johnstone and Scherer, 2000; Juslin and Laukka,
2003). In sum, the results from the CA corroborate that the
mapping between acoustic cues in speech and music fit a
dimensional model (according to which, music communicates
arousal and valence), better than a Basic Emotions one
(according to which, music communicates a set of discrete
emotions).
Taken together, the evidence from cross-cultural and
developmental studies, and from research into the expression
of emotion in vocalizations and music leads to the following
conclusions:
(1) There is a great number of coincidences between
acoustic patterns in speech prosody and in music.
These coincidences are consistent with the view that
the perception of emotional expressions in music and
in vocalizations depends, at least partly, in shared
psychological and neural mechanisms (Escoffier et al.,
2012).
(2) Just as found in research into emotional vocalizations in
general, most of the parallels between psychoacoustic cues
to emotional expression in speech prosody and music can
be mapped onto different levels of arousal2.
(3) If we limit the analysis to the cues that are both present
in prosody and music, it is difficult to find consistent and
unambiguous patterns that can be mapped onto variations
in valence and/or discrete emotions. At the same time, the
more we include cues present exclusively in music (such
as modality, and harmonic and rhythmic complexity), the
more we find distinct associations between configurations
of acoustic cues and the expression of specific emotions.3
(4) Conversely, as predicted by Juslin’s (1997, 2001, 2003)
model, most studies have found that the more cues are
present, the more participants can successfully recognize
discrete emotions, confirming the above-mentioned
facilitating effect that the use of exaggerated prototypes
has in the discrimination of emotions by observers (Frank
and Stennett, 2001; Nelson and Russell, 2013). It is unclear,
however, the extent to which the music that people choose
to listen in their everyday lives, (as opposed to music used
in experimental studies) makes use of these stereotyped
acoustic configurations. There is evidence for example, that
valence is expressed in different ways across musical genres
(Eerola, 2011).
(5) The fewer music-specific cues are present, the more
people who are not familiarized with them have difficulties
identifying the intended expressed emotion in music
(i.e., children, and listeners from non-Western cultures).
Nevertheless, the analyses of the pattern of misattribution
made by participants in the experiments reveals that
listeners are sensitive to the levels of activity and valence
expressed by music.
(6) The results from some of the studies published after
Juslin and Laukka’s (2003) review contradict each other’s
2A notable exception is musical expression of Fear, which does not share some of
the basic psychoacoustic cues found in emotional speech. However, an analysis
of the features of the “fearful” stimuli in most experiments suggests that in
this category, the distinction between expressed and induced emotions has been
blurred. In other words, it is unclear whether music is supposed to portray the
experience of someone scared, or to frighten the listener (Vieillard et al., 2008).
3An intriguing exception is a study by Curtis and Bharucha (2010) who found that
expression of sadness in speech vocalizations by English speakers was associated
with pitch variations equivalent to the minor third interval in music. This result
was replicated by Bowling et al. (2012) with a different sample of English speakers,
but not with a sample of Tamil speakers. Hence, further replications with larger
samples of languages are necessary before accepting this hypothesis.
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TABLE 1 | Summary of findings of psychoacoustic parameters associated with emotional expression in vocalizations and music published after Juslin and Laukka’s
(2003) review.
Cue Level Music Speech
Tempo/Speech rate High Joyous, Bright, Restless, Agitated (Fabian and
Schubert, 2003)
High Arousal (Schubert, 2004)
Anger, Fear (Scherer et al., 2013)
Happiness, Anger (Juslin and Lindström, 2010;
Quinto et al., 2014)
Happiness (Eerola et al., 2013)
Happiness, Anger, Fear (Scherer et al., 2011)
Fear (Scherer et al., 2013)
Medium Anxiety, Despair, Joy, Pride (Scherer et al., 2013)
Anger, Neutral (Quinto et al., 2014)
Scary (Eerola et al., 2013)
Happiness (Scherer et al., 2011)
Anxiety, Pride (Scherer et al., 2013)
Low Low Arousal (Schubert, 2004)
Serious, Majestic (Fabian and Schubert, 2003)
Sadness (Scherer et al., 2013)
Tenderness, Sadness, Fear (Juslin and Lindström,
2010)
Sad, Peaceful (Eerola et al., 2013)
Fear, Sadness, Tenderness (Quinto et al., 2014)
Anger, Sadness (Scherer et al., 2011)
Anger, Despair, Joy, Sadness (Scherer et al., 2013)
Intensity /Sound
level
Loud Restless, Agitated, Tense (Fabian and Schubert,
2003)
Anger (Juslin and Lindström, 2010)
Positive Arousal (Schubert, 2004;
Weninger et al., 2013)
Anger, Fear (Scherer et al., 2013)
Anger, Happiness (Quinto et al., 2014)
High Arousal (Weninger et al., 2013)
Scary (Eerola et al., 2013)
Positive Energetic Arousal, Positive Tense Arousal (Illie
and Thompson, 2006)
Happiness, Anger (Scherer et al., 2011)
Anger, Fear, Joy (Scherer et al., 2013)
High Arousal (Weninger et al., 2013)
Medium Anger, Pride (Scherer et al., 2013) Despair, Pride (Scherer et al., 2013)
Soft Delicate, Graceful, Relaxed, Quiet (Fabian and
Schubert, 2003)
Negative Arousal (Schubert, 2004; Weninger et al.,
2013)
Positive Valence, Negative Tense Arousal (Illie and
Thompson, 2006)
Fear, Tenderness (Juslin and Lindström, 2010)
Sad, Peaceful (Eerola et al., 2013)
Low Arousal (Weninger et al., 2013)
Sadness, Tenderness (Quinto et al., 2014)
Positive Valence, Negative Energetic Arousal,
Negative Tense Arousal (Illie and Thompson, 2006)
Anxiety, Sadness (Scherer et al., 2013)
Low Arousal (Weninger et al., 2013)
Pitch/Fundamental
Frequency
High Positive Tense Arousal (Illie and Thompson, 2006)
Anger,Fear (Juslin and Lindström, 2010)
Happiness, Peaceful (Eerola et al., 2013)
Positive Valence, Positive Energetic Arousal (Illie and
Thompson, 2006)
High Arousal (Weninger et al., 2013)
Happiness, Anger, Fear (Scherer et al., 2011)
Low Negative Tense Arousal (Illie and Thompson, 2006)
Happiness, Tenderness (Juslin and Lindström, 2010)
Scary, Sad (Eerola et al., 2013)
Negative Energetic Arousal (Illie and Thompson, 2006)
Sadness (Scherer et al., 2011)
Low Arousal (Weninger et al., 2013)
Timbre / Relative
spectral energy
Bright, Sharp Anger (Juslin and Lindström, 2010)
Joy (Scherer et al., 2013)
Scary (Eerola et al., 2013)
Anger (Scherer et al., 2013)
Medium Anxiety, Despair (Scherer et al., 2013);
Happy (Eerola et al., 2013)
Anxiety, Despair, Fear, Pride (Scherer et al., 2013)
Dull, Soft Sadness, Tenderness (Juslin and Lindström, 2010)
Fear, Happiness, Tenderness (Juslin and Lindström,
2010)
Sad, Peaceful (Eerola et al., 2013)
Sadness (Scherer et al., 2013)
Sadness (Scherer et al., 2013)
Vibrato/ Voice
irregularity
High Anger, Fear (Juslin and Lindström, 2010)
High jitter (Vibrato) and high shimmer in Anger, Fear,
Pride, Joy (Scherer et al., 2013)
High Shimmer in Anger, Fear, Joy (Scherer et al.,
2013)
Low Low jitter (vibrato) and low shimmer in Anxiety, Despair,
Sadness (Scherer et al., 2013)
Low shimmer in Anxiety, Pride, Sadness (Scherer
et al., 2013)
(Continued)
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 February 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 215
fpsyg-09-00215 February 27, 2018 Time: 16:17 # 10
Cespedes-Guevara and Eerola Constructionist Account of Musical Expressivity
TABLE 1 | Continued
Cue Level Music Speech
Melodic / Pitch
contours
Rising – Happiness, Anger (Scherer et al., 2011)






Large Tritones, Intervals larger than octave = Dynamism,
Instability (Costa et al., 2004)
Unison, Octaves = Potency (Costa et al., 2004)
Positive/excited emotion (Bowling et al., 2012)
Small Negative/subdued emotion (Bowling et al., 2012) Minor third in Sad speech (Curtis and Bharucha, 2010)
Negative/ Subdued Emotion in English Speakers,
not Tamil speakers (Bowling et al., 2012)
Mode Major Positive Valence (Costa et al., 2004; Quinto et al., 2014)
Happiness, Tenderness (Juslin and Lindström, 2010;
Quinto et al., 2014)
Peaceful (Eerola et al., 2013)
–
Minor Negative Valence (Costa et al., 2004)
Sadness, Dreamy, Dignified, Tension, Disgust, Anger,
Fear, Sadness (Juslin and Lindström, 2010)
Scary, Sad (Eerola et al., 2013)
Anger, Fear, Sadness (Quinto et al., 2014)
–
Articulation Staccato High arousal (Quinto et al., 2014)
Fear (Juslin and Lindström, 2010)
Happy (Eerola et al., 2013)
Anger, Fear, Happiness (Quinto et al., 2014)
–
Legato Low arousal (Quinto et al., 2014)
Tenderness, Sadness (Juslin and Lindström, 2010;
Quinto et al., 2014)






Sharp duration contrasts in Happiness, Anger,
Tenderness (Juslin and Lindström, 2010)
Higher rhythmic contrasts for Anger, Sadness,
Happiness (Quinto et al., 2014)
–
Simple / Soft Soft duration contrasts in Sadness, Tenderness (Juslin
and Lindström, 2010)








Negative Valence (Costa et al., 2004)




Positive Valence (Costa et al., 2004) –
Attacks Fast Happiness, Anger (Juslin and Lindström, 2010)
Slow Sadness, Tenderness (Juslin and Lindström, 2010)
Terms in boldface show agreements between music and speech, terms in red are inconsistencies across the cue levels, and terms in blue are controversial synonyms
that do not clearly correspond to basic emotions.
TABLE 2 | Correspondence Analysis: Variance explained across Domains and two emotion mappings (Basic Emotions and Quadrants of the Two Dimensions).
Music Speech
Basic emotions Dimensions Basic emotions Dimensions
Dim 1. 34.5% 46.2% 68.0% 72.2%
Dim 2. 26.3% 29.6% 20.2% 21.4%
Dim 3. 22.2% 24.2% 6.6% 6.4%
Dim 4. 17.0% 5.2%
X2(CI) 29.2 (27.5–31.4) 24.6 (22.7–26.5) 18.3 (17.1–19.6) 16.6 (15.4–17.7)
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findings, and Juslin and Laukka’s conclusions. These
inconsistencies can be attributed to several reasons. First,
there are important differences in procedures, materials,
and measurement scales across studies. In particular,
discrepancies in the way emotions are labeled can lead
to different results. For instance, it is not the same to
ask musicians to produce music that sounds angry than
to ask them to produce music that sounds frustrated,
irritated, or furious; and likewise, these adjectives are
not necessarily equivalent from a listener’s point of view.
Second, it is possible that some of the inconsistencies in
the psychoacoustic cues associated with the expression of
emotions are due to the presence of interactions between
several cues (but see Eerola et al., 2013). Thirdly, a most
parsimonious explanation is that often the underlying
dimensions would explain the same patterns, and therefore
the success of discriminating basic emotion categories
cannot be taken at a face value of providing positive
evidence for these.
FROM AFFECTIVE DIMENSIONS TO
CATEGORICAL PERCEPTION OF
EMOTIONS
As mentioned above, the best support for the existence of Basic
Emotions is the finding that when participants are asked to
judge the emotion communicated by a portrayed facial, vocal
or musical expression, they agree in the correct answer above
chance level4 (Scherer et al., 2011). This finding, however,
entails a paradox: people’s perception of these stimuli is clearly
organized into categories, and they tend to agree as to which
categories correspond to every stimulus they judge. However,
these categories do not seem to be present in the stimuli whether
it be facial expressions, vocalizations, or musical materials. As
we have argued, there is little evidence that the predicted facial
vocal patterns occur in natural circumstances; the evidence for
expressive patterns associated with discrete emotions is elusive
(particularly in vocalizations); and the acoustic cues of emotional
expression shared by vocalizations and music are more clearly
related to arousal than to discrete emotions. In other words,
whereas objective measures of emotional expression have failed to
find distinct categories, people’s subjective perception of emotion
is categorical (Barrett, 2006b). As we show in this section, this
paradox can be resolved by considering the way cultural and
perceptual categories are constructed, and the crucial role that
context has in the perception of emotional expressions.
Discrete Emotional Categories Are in the
Eye (and the Ear) of the Beholder
The first argument that helps dissolve the paradox can be found
(surprisingly, given our preceding critique) in a passage of a paper
by Juslin (2013). When confronted with the above-mentioned
inconsistency, Juslin concedes that discrete categories exist in
4Admittedly, this level of decoding accuracy is lower for vocal expressions (around
59%) than for facial expressions (around 77%).
people’s minds, not in the materials (facial expressions, voices, or
music):
“It’s clear that the acoustic patterns obtained do not always neatly
correspond to categories. But to look for discrete categories in the
acoustic data is to look at the wrong place altogether. Categorical
perception is a creation of the mind, it’s not in the physical
stimulus” (Juslin, 2013, p. 5 italics added).
The importance of this observation is paramount, because
it suggests that the findings about universal perceptions of
emotions are not due to emotions having a common, discrete
biological substrate, but to the existence of common emotion
concepts that organize people’s perception of emotions. Indeed,
the existence of a limited, universal set of emotion concepts in
people’s perceptual systems and languages need not arise from a
set of biologically predetermined discrete emotions; it can simply
occur because all humans across cultures face the same relevant
events (e.g., facing a threat, losing something valued, confronting
goal-obstructing situations, discovering outcomes that are better
than expected, etc.). If all human beings face the same type of
goal-relevant situations, and they evaluate them in similar ways,
then it follows that all cultures must create similar conceptual
and linguistic categories to denote them (Scherer, 1994; Frijda,
2008)
Nevertheless, the existence of these common conceptual
and linguistic categories does not completely dissolve the
paradox. The existence of cross-culturally shared categories
does not explain why, when presented with exaggerated, posed
expressions, most participants attribute the same emotional
category to the same stimuli, and why they still tend to select the
same category when they judge facial, vocal or musical stimuli
portrayed by people from other cultures. Hence, the second
argument that dissolves the perceptual paradox has to be found
in an examination of the way people use and construct mental
prototypes.
Research into the construction of mental categories has shown
that people construct ideal representations to categorize similar
objects, even when they have never seen an object containing all
the features of the ideal representation. Particularly in the domain
of face recognition, a number of studies have demonstrated that
when participants are presented with a number of similar faces,
they implicitly build prototypes “averaging” their features, and
that these prototypes are so strong that they create false memories
of having seen them before (Solso and McCarthy, 1981; Bruce
et al., 1991; Cabeza et al., 1999; De Fockert and Wolfenstein,
2009). Similarly, another line of research has also shown that
even when researchers present participants with large numbers
of stimuli that gradually vary along a continuum, they perceive
them as separated by boundaries that divide them into discrete
categories (Young et al., 1997; Laukka, 2005; Brosch et al., 2010).
Taken together, the findings from these two lines of research
help understand how, although the exaggerated facial and
vocal stimuli used in emotion expression research actually
occur rarely in spontaneous interactions, people construct ideal
representations or prototypes, which influence perception of
emotionally expressive stimuli in a top-down manner, creating
artificial discrete categories (Brosch et al., 2010).
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The same process of prototype construction which leads
to categorical perception probably occurs in perception of
emotional expressions in music too. Although the exaggerated
emotional expressions used in experimental research may rarely
be found in music that people listen to in everyday circumstances,
they are easily identified as belonging to basic emotion categories
because people’s perception of emotional expressions is based
on categories that use the average prototype as a guide for
classification. Additionally, it is also likely that in the case of
Western listeners, these mental prototypes are also derived from
their exposure to culturally shared images and symbols such as
the classic Greek images for comedy and tragedy, the facial and
vocal expressions of cartoons, and the associations between visual
narratives and music soundtracks.
The Role of Contexts in the Perception of
Emotional Expressions
Implicit to the Basic Emotion approach is the assumption
that emotional meanings are inherent to facial, vocal, and
musical expressions, and therefore they can be readily decoded
by perceivers, independently of the situation where the
expression is displayed. This assumption is based on an
evolutionary argument, according to which, it is adaptive
for animals to communicate discrete emotional categories
using fixed expressive patterns, which can be recognized
by an observer in any circumstance (Ekman, 1992; Juslin
and Laukka, 2003). This assumption in turn, has inspired
hundreds of studies where researchers have attempted to
identify emotional meanings in facial, vocal, bodily, and musical
expressions that can be identified by any observer, in any
situation.
The problem with the evolutionary argument put forward
by the Basic Emotions tradition is that it assumes that
expressive gestures and vocalizations always originate in an
underlying emotional state, and that they are always perceived
as communicating emotions by observers, as if humans and
animals ever expressed and perceived emotions in context-free
situations. Ethologists, -researchers of animal communication,
have shown how evolution has favored flexibility over rigidness,
and the communication of social intentions over emotional
states, even in non-human primates (Parr et al., 2005; Demuru
et al., 2015; Fröhlich et al., 2016). This alternative view proposes
that the gestures displayed by an animal in a given circumstance
depend on the demands of the situation, and that it is more
advantageous for an animal to display gestures to communicate
intentions and to influence other animals, rather than to
show its emotional state (Fridlund, 1994; Bachorowski, 1999;
Rendall et al., 2009). For example, it is more advantageous
for a primate to display an expression of anger when it wants
to intimidate a rival (thus preventing the confrontation from
happening), than when it has the intention of attacking and
overcoming its rival immediately (Fridlund, 1994). Similarly,
studies with human participants have shown how emotional
expressions vary according to the characteristics of the situation,
and communicate different intentions accordingly. For instance,
people do not necessarily smile more when they experience
positive results on their own, but they do smile more when
they communicate those positive results to other people (Kraut
and Johnston, 1979; Ruiz-Belda et al., 2003). Also, different
types of smiles are associated with different social intentions,
and are perceived accordingly. For example, embarrassment
smiles seem to have the function of appeasing the negative
judgment of observers, whereas enjoyment smiles have the
function of increasing closeness with others (Niedenthal et al.,
2010).
That the interpretation of emotional expressions is flexible and
tailored to the situation where they occur is also evident in the
way observers perceive different meanings in facial expressions
and vocalizations according to contextual information. Several
experiments on perception of emotional expressions have
demonstrated this effect (see Barrett et al., 2011 for a review
of the evidence). For example, Carroll and Russell (1996)
showed how even exaggerated portrayals of emotions can
be perceived as expressing different emotions, or even non-
emotional states when they are associated with different contexts.
For instance, when participants observed a face showing the
prototypical anger expression with frown eyebrows and bare
teeth, they perceived it alternatively as expressive of anger,
fear, or physical exertion, depending on the narrative they read
about the situation that led the person to make that facial
expression.
A defender of the Basic Emotion approach could reply to
this argument by saying that in a psychological experiment, the
participants who judge the portrayed stimuli encounter them in
a context-free situation. Yet this argument can be challenged by
considering that in these experiments, the context is provided
by the list of emotional adjectives that the participants have
to choose from to make their judgment. These lists effectively
restrict the number and type of inferences that participants can
make about the psychological state of the person portraying the
expression, and therefore bias their perception of it (Russell, 1994;
Frank and Stennett, 2001). Research has shown that when instead
of close-ended questionnaires, investigators use open answers, or
tasks asking participants to match two faces expressing the same
emotion, agreement among participants diminishes dramatically
(Nelson and Russell, 2013).
In the music domain, the biasing effect that response formats
have on perception has been demonstrated in studies where
researchers ask participants to rate music in non-emotional
terms, such as sharpness, weight, smoothness, moisture, and
temperature (Eitan and Rothschild, 2011); movement (Eitan and
Granot, 2006; Sievers et al., 2013); spatial height, mass, strength,
and brightness (Eitan and Timmers, 2010); and people’s traits
(Watt and Ash, 1998). In all of these experiments, researchers
have observed high levels of agreement in participants’ ratings,
suggesting that musical meanings, just like facial and vocal
expressions, are flexible, not inherent to the musical materials,
and not restricted to a few standard emotional categories.
In sum, the consideration of the role that contexts play biasing
the perception of emotional expressions is a third argument
that resolves the paradox: people tend to agree on the emotions
expressed by facial gestures, vocalizations, and music, because
they find significant cues in the situation, and the response format
that they are asked to use to make their decision.
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A Constructionist Account of the
Perception of Discrete Emotions in Music
In this final section, we draw from constructionist theories of
emotion (Russell, 2003; Barrett, 2006a; Barrett et al., 2007),
constructionist theories of musical meaning (Cook, 2001;
DeNora, 2003), and ecological theories of music perception
(Dibben, 2001; Clarke, 2005) to propose an alternative view of the
phenomenon of expression and perception of musical emotions.
What these theories have in common is the assumption that
emotional or musical meanings are not inherent in expressive
behaviors and musical sounds, but emerge from the interaction
of the materials (i.e., the configuration of the facial expressions,
the acoustic qualities of the voice, or the structure of the
musical work), the knowledge and goals of the observer, and the
characteristics of the situation where the expressive behavior or
musical work occurs.
According to Barrett’s Conceptual Act Theory (Barrett,
2006a,b, 2011), emotional experiences occur much in the same
way as the perception of colors. Although shades of colors consist
of continuum wavelengths, we perceive them categorically,
because in the act of perceiving a color of an object we quickly
combine top-down information (such as knowledge of linguistic
labels for colors and typical objects associated with them) with
bottom-up sensorial information, creating the experience of
seeing discrete colors (Barrett, 2006b, p. 27). Analogously, for the
Conceptual Act Theory, the experience of having an emotion and
the experience of perceiving an emotion in another person occur
when top-down knowledge from past emotional experiences is
quickly combined with information about the present situation,
and sensory information from our own body, or from the
other person’s behavior. In the case of experiencing emotions
in oneself, the most important source of sensorial information
consists of fluctuations of core affect, an underlying affective tone
experienced as variations in valence (feelings of pleasantness)
and arousal (feelings of activation) (Russell and Barrett, 1999).
In the case of perceiving emotions in another individual, the
sensorial information consists in the behaviors of the other
person, which at the very least, signal that person’s core affect
(i.e., how activated and pleasant he or she is feeling) (Carroll and
Russell, 1996). Barrett calls the process of categorization of core
affect a conceptual act, in order to emphasize the immediacy of
the process, and its dependence on the existence of previously
acquired knowledge, (including implicit linguistic knowledge of
emotion categories). Thus, for Barrett emotional experiences are
context-dependent episodes that emerge from the combination of
more basic psychological and physiological processes, and are not
determined by the triggering of biologically pre-determined affect
programs associated with prototypical stimuli or expressions (as
assumed by Basic Emotion theories).
How can this theoretical framework be adapted to the case
of the perception of emotions in music? Our claim is that,
although there is enough basis to conclude that expression of
emotions in music is ultimately founded on an overlap with the
mechanisms of emotional expression in vocalizations, when we
strip music from culture-specific cues, and we focus exclusively
on those acoustic parameters present both in emotional prosody
and music, we are left with an essentially ambiguous material
that can only specify variations of arousal, -and to a lesser extent,
of valence (i.e., core affect). However, musical sounds afford the
perception of specific, discrete meanings (including emotional
ones) when the listener’s mind combines top-down knowledge
from past musical experiences, information about his or her
current affective state, and cues about the meaning of the event
where the music is playing.
Consistent with this constructionist approach, we claim
that perceiving emotions in music consists of an active
process of meaning construction, where the ambiguous
affective information provided by the music acoustic cues
becomes differentiated and categorized into discrete meanings
in a conceptual act. This ambiguous information becomes
differentiated into discrete percepts thanks to associative
mechanisms that integrate a variety of sources of information
effortlessly and automatically. Some of these sources of
information have their origin in implicit psychological processes
such as the process of prototype construction described
above, and the use of linguistic labels that organize emotional
experiences into discrete categories (Lindquist, 2009). Other
sources of information are originated in cultural conventions
such as the association between mode and musical valence,
and in personal associations, such as the use of musical genres
for mood-regulation strategies (e.g., listening to a piece of
classical music to experience relaxation). Finally, other sources
of information are context-specific, such as the listener’s current
mood and goals, the presence of lyrics with emotional content,
the presentation of visual narratives presented along the music
(e.g., in a movie), the observation of gestures made by the
musicians, and the listener’s sensitivity to the cultural meaning of
the situation where the music takes place (e.g., a funeral, a mass,
a graduation ceremony, etc.).
It is important to note that this proposal does not amount to
saying that musical meanings are completely free, idiosyncratic,
and as variable as the contexts in which they occur. On the
contrary, drawing from the ecological perspective to music
perception mentioned above, our claim is that musical structures
afford certain meanings to be privileged over alternative ones
(Dibben, 2001; Clarke, 2005). Moreover, since musical perception
of emotions is built on our ability to perceive variations of
arousal and valence in speech, this shared code biases the musical
meanings that people attribute to music, making them coherent
with the level of activity and pleasantness expressed by the
musical structures. For instance, it is unlikely that listeners
perceive a loud, dissonant, and fast piece of music as expressive of
tenderness and that they use it as a lullaby, because the objective
qualities of the music are incompatible with relaxed bodily states
and cultural notions of motherly love.
At this point, we deem it necessary to point to two important
areas of coincidence and difference between our proposal and
the Basic Emotions approach to music expressivity, proposed
by Juslin and colleagues, and with the theory of dynamic
communication of core affect proposed by Flaig and Large (2014).
In the first place, the constructionist approach here proposed
complements, rather than replaces the lens model proposed
by Juslin (1997, 2003) and Juslin and Lindström (2010). The
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lens model, with its emphasis on the process of encoding and
decoding of psychoacoustic cues, finds it hard to explain how it is
possible that people can identify the correct emotional expression
when there are few cues present in the musical material, and/or
when they are not perceived by listeners. From our perspective,
this paradox is resolved by considering the role of contexts and of
musical and emotional knowledge in the construction of musical
meanings. Thus, contextual clues, and the sources of information
described above can lead to the perception of emotional and
non-emotional meanings in the music even when the musical
materials do not correspond to the prototypical stimuli used in
most experimental research.
Second, the fact that music can express non-basic emotions
and other affective states is to some extent acknowledged in
Juslin’s theory of musical expressivity (Juslin, 2013). In his
model, three layers of coding explain music’s ability to represent
basic emotions, and non-basic emotions such as hope and
solemnity: an iconic layer that communicates basic emotions, an
intrinsic layer that communicates fluctuations of tension, and
an associative layer that communicates “arbitrary” associations
(Juslin, 2013, p. 4). In our view, it is unnecessary to propose
the existence of these layers. We find it more parsimonious to
dispose of the idea that the iconic level denotes discrete basic
emotions, and to assume that music communicates fluctuations
of affect which can be mapped onto many possible meanings via
associative mechanisms.
Third, the constructionist framework we propose has many
points of coincidence with the theory of dynamic music
communication of core affect proposed by Flaig and Large (2014),
according to which, music communicates primarily core affect
thanks to processes of non-linear resonance between musical
structures and patterns of neural oscillation. However, whereas
the focus of their theory is on the neural mechanisms responsible
for the perception of the affect specified by music, the focus
of ours is on the psychological processes that transform those
fluctuations of core affect into the experience of perceiving
a discrete emotion expressed by music. In this sense, our
theory complements Flaig and Large’s (2014) one, by specifying
the processes of categorization that make listeners experience
a variety of emergent emotional percepts according to the
characteristics of the personal, situational, and cultural context
where the music takes place.
CONCLUSION
In this article we argued that despite the widespread assumption
that musical expressivity is organized around a limited set
of discrete, biologically pre-determined basic emotions, there
are serious theoretical and empirical arguments that contradict
this claim. We demonstrated that although there is evidence
for the claim that the expression and perception of musical
emotions arises from mechanisms that are shared with the
expression and perception of speech prosody, this common
biological ground is not organized around discrete categories.
We also showed how the perceptual paradox, (consisting of the
inconsistency of findings from objective and subjective measures
of emotional expression), can be resolved by considering that
the categorical perception of emotional expressions emerges
from: (a) the existence of common linguistic categories, (b)
the construction of ideal representations which create the
illusion of the existence of prototypical expressions in natural
situations; and (c) the disambiguating effect that contextual
information has in the perception of emotional expressions.
Thus, we submit that there is no need to invoke the existence
of hardwired basic emotions to explain how people perceive
categories in vocalizations and in music. Instead, we submit
that this phenomenon can be better accounted for by adopting
a constructionist approach to emotions. In this approach,
the acoustical cues present in music can be mapped onto
variations of core affect (i.e., activation and valence), which
become discrete percepts thanks to the onset of quick associative
mechanisms that integrate information from past knowledge,
contextual information, and the listener’s current psychological
state.
The proposal that people’s perception of meanings in music
is flexible and varies according to different listening contexts
has several implications for research into musical emotions.
First, this perceptual flexibility suggests that finding that listeners
can identify discrete emotions in music, does not suggest that
people usually engage with music with the primary objective of
decoding the emotions that it expresses. Moreover, people’s ability
to perceive discrete emotions in music does not suggest that when
people perceive emotions expressed by music, they experience
them as discrete categories, or that the categories they perceive
correspond to the discrete emotional adjectives that experimental
research has investigated (Clarke, 2014). Hence, adopting this
constructionist approach to musical emotions implies a shift
in the focus of research from identifying associations between
musical structures and emotion percepts, to identifying the
conditions under which people perceive emotional meanings
in music, and the conditions under which they perceive non-
emotional ones.
Second, studying these sources of variation in people’s
perception of emotions in music, involves studying how these
meanings are constructed in everyday life contexts. On most
occasions, people listen to music embedded in “extra-musical”
elements such as lyrics, videos, photographs, social events, the
presence of other listeners, etc. Given that all this contextual
information has pronounced impact on the listeners’ emotional
experiences with music (Eerola et al., 2015) studies should start
mapping the influence of these factors in people’s perceived
meanings in a systematic manner.
Third, we have argued that the affective information that
music “by itself ” can provide consists of variations of core
affect: arousal and valence. However, it is conceivable that these
two dimensions do not exhaust all the affective information
that musical materials afford, and that listeners are sensitive to
variations of energy and tension (Schimmack and Grob, 2000) or
of power (Fontaine et al., 2007). Future studies should attempt
to determine which dimensions, besides arousal and valence,
underlie musical expression of emotions, and the contextual
conditions under which these dimensions become more salient
and differentiated.
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Fourth, several researchers have proposed that one
mechanism that leads to the induction of emotions by music
(i.e., the experience that music changes our emotional state)
is emotional contagion, whence we perceive that a piece of
music expresses a particular emotion, and we feel that the
same emotion is aroused in ourselves (Juslin and Västfjäll, 2008;
Davies, 2010; Schubert, 2013). According to the BRECVEMAC
theory proposed by Juslin and Västfjäll (2008) and Juslin et al.
(2010, 2016), musical emotional contagion occurs because the
perception of basic emotions in music triggers processes of
internal mimicry in the listener, which in turn lead to an
induction of the same emotion (Juslin and Västfjäll, 2008, p. 565).
Adopting the constructionist approach to musical expressivity
implies that even on those occasions when we observe a
correspondence between perceived and induced emotion, we
should not assume that the perceived basic emotion was the only,
nor the main factor driving the listener’s emotional experience.
Given that contextual, personal and cultural factors produce
variations in experiences of perceiving emotions expressed by
music, it is likely that they also influence the quality of the
emotion aroused in the listener.
Fifth, the constructionist approach here proposed also has
methodological implications. Despite the knowledge that decades
of research into the association between musical structures and
perception of emotion have provided, we will not advance
our understanding of this phenomenon by continuing to use
experimental designs where stimuli have stereotyped musical
configurations, and response formats consists of close-ended
lists of basic emotion adjectives. In our view, the way out
of this circular logic is to start using more ambiguous
musical stimuli, open-ended response formats, qualitative data
about the listener’s perspective, manipulations of contextual
information, and priming of cultural knowledge. Only by
expanding the scope of research in this way can we learn
how factors in the musical materials, the context (e.g., lyrics,
visual narratives, program notes), and the listener’s knowledge
interact in the process of construction of perception and
meaning-making. Given that conceptual acts usually occur
quickly, automatically and non-consciously, self-report measures
should be complemented with physiological and implicit ones
that do not depend on participants’ introspection. Moreover,
the emphasis that this theoretical approach makes on the
variety and flexibility of people’s emotional experiences with
music, implies that variation in listener’s reports should
not be discarded as errors of measurement, but regarded
as informative data that needs to be incorporated and
explained.
Finally, we submit that adopting the constructionist
approach to perception of emotions in music can further our
understanding the variety of emotional meanings are constructed
in contexts such as musical videos, film music, advertisements,
and music therapy. Already the applied psychology of music
has taken this road by starting to focus on the contextual
uses of music; music and well-being studies consider emotions
as something which are essentially active regulation of one’s
mood in a particular context (Saarikallio, 2011). Similarly,
Music Information Retrieval (MIR) has taken the contextualized
approach seriously when developing better recommendation
services by incorporating situational information and personal
information to aid mood discovery (Yang and Liu, 2013). In
the same sense, this theoretical approach is better suited than
Basic Emotion approaches for building much needed bridges
between music psychology and other disciplines interested in
understanding people’s affective experiences with music such as
ethnomusicology, historical musicology, popular music studies,
sociology of music, and music therapy.
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